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ABSTRACT
The relationship between financial liberalization policies and financial development is controver-
sial. The impact of these policies differs greatly across countries. In the literature, the quality of
formal institutions has been identified as an important source of this heterogeneity, as countries
with a weak institutional environment generally fail to benefit from financial liberalization. Using
panel data covering 82 countries for the period 1973–2008, we find evidence that social capital
may substitute for formal institutions as a prerequisite for effective financial liberalization policies.
In particular, we find that during the post Washington-consensus period countries with a high
prevailing level of social capital can ensure that financial liberalization positively influences
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I. Introduction
While research on the relationship between financial
development and economic growth is still expanding,
there appears to be consensus that financial develop-
ment has a positive influence on economic growth
(Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000). This consensus ren-
ders the factors that influence financial development
important. Especially policy makers of countries with
less developed financial sectors may benefit from a
better understanding of the forces that shape their
financial sector. Consequently, there has been a
spike in research on the determinants of financial
development in recent years. This research has
focused on long-run (e.g. culture, geography, etc.) as
well as short-run (e.g. macroeconomic policies) deter-
minants of financial development.
Financial liberalization is one of the short-run
determinants that has been put forward as a poten-
tially important prerequisite for successful financial
development. This view rests on the belief that
liberalizing financial markets allows interest rates
to reach their competitive market equilibrium,
which will boost savings, investments and ulti-
mately economic growth (McKinnon 1973; Shaw
1973). Based on this view, policy makers have
been liberalizing their financial sectors since the
1970s. This accelerated during the 1990s, after
Williamson (1990) introduced what he called the
‘Washington consensus’.
This view has been contested, however, both in
academic research as well as by practical experience.
For example, in the early 1980s Latin American
countries such as Chile and Argentina experienced
huge macroeconomic crises after a period of strong
financial liberalization (Diaz-Alejandro 1985). Also,
the Asian crisis of 1997–1998 was, at least partly,
due to financial liberalization programmes these
countries had been carried out since the late 1980s
(Mishkin 1999). These and other experiences sug-
gest that we still do not exactly know under what
conditions financial liberalization policies really
work, i.e. the context in which these policies are
carried out may have an impact on the outcomes
of these policies.
Recently, research has started exploring the
underlying sources of the observed heterogeneity
with respect to the effects of financial liberalization
on financial development and economic growth.
Factors that have been identified as prerequisites of
successful financial liberalization are bureaucratic
efficiency, a strong rule of law, proper contract
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enforcement, control over corruption and prudential
regulation and supervision (Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache 1998; Summers 2000; Hermes and
Meesters 2015).
In this article, we contribute to this literature by
investigating the importance of social capital as a
prerequisite for effective financial liberalization poli-
cies. In particular, we argue that social capital may
substitute for failing formal institutions. That is,
financial liberalization policies may be effective in
stimulating financial development, even if strong
formal institutions are absent, as long as social capi-
tal development is strong.
The remainder of this article is organized as fol-
lows. Section II discusses the literature describing
the impact of financial liberalization on financial
development. In this section, we also discuss social
capital and how this may act as a prerequisite for
effective financial liberalization policies. Section III
describes our empirical methodology and provides a
description of our data set. The results of the empiri-
cal analysis are discussed in Section IV. Section V
concludes the study.
II. Financial development, financial
liberalization and social capital: a literature
review
Financial development and the pros and cons of
financial liberalization
Financial development occurs when financial mar-
kets or institutions reduce market imperfections,
thereby allowing capital to flow to its most produc-
tive use (Čihák et al. 2012). In the 1950s and 1960s,
conventional wisdom stipulated that governments
could promote development by protecting and inter-
vening in financial markets, using policies such as
interest rate ceilings and credit controls, and estab-
lishing state-owned banks. Government interven-
tions like these are commonly referred to in the
literature as financial repression (Andersen and
Tarp 2003). These policies became subject to severe
criticism in the early 1970s by McKinnon (1973) and
Shaw (1973), who argued that liberalizing financial
sectors would spur growth. According to them,
keeping interest rates low negatively affects savings,
which hampers the development of the banking
system. Likewise, it creates excess demand for credit,
which harms efficient allocation of capital as banks
have no incentive to direct credit towards the most
profitable projects.1
From the 1970s, countries throughout the world
acted gradually started liberalizing their financial
sectors by reducing interest and credit controls,
reducing entry barriers for domestic and foreign
banks, and liberalizing the capital account.
Increased bank competition was expected to stimu-
late financial development as banks would offer
higher interest rates to attract more savings, enabling
them to provide more investment. Moreover, com-
petition would provide incentives to reduce over-
head costs and improve on bank and risk
management (Denizer, Dinc, and Tarimcilar 2007),
while the entry of foreign banks would stimulate the
spillover of new bank- and risk-management techni-
ques and the development of new financial instru-
ments and services (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Huizinga 2001). Capital account liberalization was
expected to increase possibilities for portfolio diver-
sification for domestic as well as foreign investor,
which would also encourage domestic financial mar-
ket development (Chinn and Ito 2006). Among
developing countries, financial liberalization
occurred especially in the post Washington-consen-
sus period (i.e. after 1990), arguably because these
countries feared their economies would miss out on
the benefits of an increasingly global world economy
(Gore 2000).
The expected positive effects of financial liberal-
ization have been disputed. Stiglitz (2000) argues
that the argument that liberalizing repressed finan-
cial sectors leads to more efficient credit allocation is
flawed. While under perfect information this may be
true, financial markets are characterized by asym-
metric information. Stiglitz shows that under asym-
metric information, decentralization through the
price mechanism (i.e. allowing banks to set their
interest rates freely) will not necessarily lead to a
Pareto-efficient equilibrium.
Boot (2000) argues that financial liberalization
may actually aggravate information asymmetries.
As bank competition is increased and interest rates
go down, borrowers may have an incentive to end
long-lasting relationships with their banks. When
1See Loizos (2017) for a recent review of the financial repression-liberalization debate.
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borrowers switch to other banks, the information
that the previous bank has collected with respect to
their borrowers is no longer of value, which
increases information asymmetries.
Increased competition between banks may also
lead to a reduction in franchise value which, in
turn, may lead to increased risk taking. As less
efficient banks fail to compete by reducing overhead
costs, they may adopt a gambling strategy, i.e. they
reduce collection of information and monitoring
efforts in order to remain profitable (Hellmann,
Murdock, and Stiglitz 2000; Andersen and Tarp
2003). While in the long run inefficient banks will
likely be replaced by more efficient ones (Kaminsky
and Schmukler 2008), at least in the short run,
financial liberalization may lead to instability instead
of efficiency.
Finally, several authors stress that capital inflows
following financial liberalization are often of a spec-
ulative nature and do not lead to long-run invest-
ments (Rodrik 1998; Stiglitz 2000). This may lead to
sudden capital outflows, potentially followed by
banks runs and banking crises (Diamond and
Dybvig 1983; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache
1998; Rodrik 1998).
The criticism on the positive view of financial
liberalization has been corroborated by experiences
from practice. Several countries have experienced
deep financial crises, in some cases accompanied by
sharp economic downturns. The recent global finan-
cial and economic crisis of 2007–2008 is a clear
example of this, but also the crises experienced by
the Southeast Asian countries in 1997–1999, Mexico
in 1996, Argentina and Chile in the early 1980s are a
case in point.
Empirical studies find mixed results with respect
to the effectiveness of financial liberalization in sti-
mulating financial development. While the net effect
of financial liberalization appears to be positive
(Huang 2011), there is large heterogeneity between
countries and time periods. In light of this hetero-
geneity, recent empirical literature has started to
identify the prerequisites of successful financial lib-
eralization policies. Several studies have focused on
the importance of effective bank regulation and
supervision. Hermes and Meesters (2015) find that
the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on bank
efﬁciency is conditional on the quality of regulation
and supervision of the banking system. This result is
corroborated by a study from the Sahay et al. (2015),
which finds evidence that financial development is
positively related to the quality of the regulatory
framework, as measured by compliance with Basel
Core Principles on banking supervision and the
Insurance Core Principles for the insurance industry.
These results support the view that proper financial
market regulation and supervision are necessary to
make sure that imprudent behaviour of banks and
other financial institutions is effectively curbed
(Andersen and Tarp 2003), preventing these institu-
tions in competitive environments (i.e. after liberal-
izing the financial sector) from taking on more risk
than is socially desirable.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find evi-
dence that a weak institutional environment – using
measures of the rule of law, level of corruption, law
enforcement and bureaucratic efficiency – and the
absence of proper regulation and supervision makes
the occurrence of financial crises more likely. Their
study suggests that institutional quality and proper
regulation and supervision appear to be important
prerequisites for successful financial liberalization.
In a similar vein, Klein and Olivei (2008) show that
capital account liberalization promotes financial
development. Yet, this result is primarily driven by
developed countries, in which institutions and bank
regulation and supervision are generally more devel-
oped. For developing countries, having lower levels
of institutional quality and bank regulation and
supervision, capital account liberalization fails to
promote financial development.
To conclude, recent empirical studies suggest that
without proper regulation and supervision of finan-
cial institutions, and without the right institutional
environment, financial liberalization may not meet
the expectations of improving financial development.
Financial development, financial liberalization and
the role of social capital
Coleman (1988) introduced the notion of social
capital as a resource – similar to human and physical
capital – on which individuals can draw when pro-
ducing or trading with other market participants.
Social capital can present itself in the form of inter-
personal trust, information sharing, and social
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norms. Higher levels of social capital (i.e. environ-
ments in which interpersonal trust, free information
sharing and strict social norms are stronger) may be
associated with better economic outcomes as they
allow individuals to be more productive.
Since the 1990s, social capital has been introduced
in empirical studies as a potentially important deter-
minant of economic growth. Overall, these studies
suggest that social capital indeed positively contri-
butes to economic growth (La Porta et al. 1997;
Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001).
Several studies stress that one of the main reasons
why social capital promotes growth is that it can be an
effective substitute of absent or failing formal institu-
tions (Ahlerup et al. 2009). The substitutability
between formal institutions and social capital rests
on two pillars. First, by trusting one another two
parties can engage in transactions that could other-
wise only be conducted if (enforceable) contracts
were specified (Knack and Keefer 1997; Fukuyama
1995). Second, substitutability between formal regu-
lation and social capital also requires that both parties
are correct to trust each other. In this respect, Boix
and Posner (1998) argue that norms and expectations
of appropriate behaviour induce people to comply
with existing rules and regulations, even if enforce-
ment mechanisms are absent. Thus, by trusting each
other people behave in ways not to break this trust.
Social capital has also been introduced in the
literature on financial development. Yet, studies
using social capital to explain financial development
are scarce. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004)
show that households and firms located in high
trust areas have a higher likelihood of obtaining
credit when they need it. Moreover, they find that
households and firms in high trust areas invest more
in stocks and use more personal checks. They argue
that persons living in high trust areas have less fear
that a financial institution expropriates their assets,
leading them to save more. Similarly, financial insti-
tutions in high trust areas provide more loans as
they have less fear that the loans will not be repaid.
Calderón, Chong, and Galindo (2002) find similar
results in a cross-country setting. In particular, they
find that countries with a higher level of social
capital tend to have larger financial sectors.
The role of social capital is also investigated in
research on the effectiveness of microfinance. Group
lending, being the dominant lending technique in
microfinance, rests on the principle of high trust
and strong social ties among group members who
are jointly responsible for the repayment of the
group loan. Several studies have shown that repay-
ment performance is determined by the existence of
high levels of social capital (Karlan 2007; Cassar
et al. 2007; Dufhues et al. 2011, 2013; Postelnicu
and Hermes, 2016).
The results of these studies suggest that higher
levels of social capital are associated with higher
levels of financial development. Yet, next to this
direct relationship, social capital may also indirectly
affect financial development by having an impact on
the relationship between financial liberalization and
financial development. As argued in the literature,
institutional quality is an important prerequisite for
the effectiveness of financial liberalization policies in
stimulating financial development. At the same time,
it has also been shown that failing institutions may
be substituted for by social capital. Combining these
two findings leads us to argue that the effectiveness
of financial liberalization in improving financial
development may be strong, even if the institutional
quality is low, in the presence of high levels of social
capital.
The intuition behind this argument can be illu-
strated as follows. When financial liberalization
policies are carried out in the presence of weak
institutions, individuals may only choose to
increase their savings rate if they have enough
trust that their funds are being held responsibly
by banks. Similarly, on the supply side, banks may
only find proper investment opportunities for their
increased availability of funds if the prevailing level
of social capital is high enough to ensure timely
repayment. Finally, the extent to which clients
switch banks after financial liberalization – which
would lead to the loss of valuable information
(Boot 2000) – may be reduced in the presence of
high levels of social capital as this is expected to
keep clients from ending long-lasting relationships
with their bank. Based on the above discussion, we
derive the following hypothesis:
H1: The association between financial liberalization
and financial development is conditional on the pre-
vailing level of social capital.
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III. Methodology and data
In order to test our hypothesis, we adopt the follow-
ing econometric model:
Growth of FDit;t4 ¼ ρ1FDit5
þ ρ2FINLIBit5 þ ρ3SCi
þ ρ4SCi  FINLIBit5
þ ρ5Xit5 þ εit; (1)
where FD refers to financial development, FINLIB
refers to the level of financial liberalization,SC refers
to the level of social capital, SC  FINLIB is an inter-
action term between social capital and financial lib-
eralization and X is a vector of control variables. The
indices i and t refer to country and time, respec-
tively. The model is specified as a growth on levels
regression equation with non-overlapping data per-
iods. More specifically, we use data for the period
1973–2008 and calculate the 4-year average growth
rate of the level of financial development as the
dependent variable. All independent variables are
measured as the level of these variables at the end
of the previous period. Thus, the growth of financial
development for the period 1974–1977 is explained
by the levels of the independent variables in 1973,
etc. This approach allows us to carry out the estima-
tions with the independent variables entering the
model one period lagged in order to control for
potential reverse causality. The dataset contains
information for 82 countries (see Table A.1 in the
Appendix to this article).
In the literature, financial development has been
measured in various ways. These measures refer to
different dimensions of financial development. In
most of the literature, the measures used focus on
financial deepening, i.e. the extent to which financial
institutions increase the size and variety of financial
services offered to economic agents. We follow a
similar strategy and use total financial system depos-
its to GDP (DEPGDP), private credit to GDP
(PRCGDP) and liquid liabilities to GDP (LLY) to
measure financial deepening. All data are retrieved
from the Global Financial Development Database
(GFDD), which has been developed by the World
Bank (Čihák et al. 2012). Since we have three
measures of financial deepening, we estimate three
different versions of our model as shown in
Equation (1), each version using a different measure
of financial deepening. Similar to what is standard in
the growth literature, we include the level of finan-
cial development at the end of the previous 4-year
period (also termed as the initial level) as one of the
independent variables to control for potential con-
vergence of the growth rate of financial development
across countries.
Financial liberalization (FINLIB) is measured
based on a dataset developed by Abiad, Detragiache,
and Tressel (2010). This dataset includes various
dimensions of financial liberalization, including mea-
sures of reducing or removing restrictions on inter-
national capital flows, credit controls and excessively
high reserve requirements, entry barriers, state own-
ership in the banking sector, and interest rate con-
trols. Each country in the dataset is rated every year
on a scale from 0 to 3 with respect to these five
dimensions, where 0 refers to complete repression
and 3 refers to a completely liberalized financial sec-
tor with respect to a specific dimension. We take the
sum of these five dimensions, which means that our
financial liberalization variable that can take on
values between 0 and 15.
Social capital (SC) is measured using data from
the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS is a
compilation of national surveys on values and
norms, carried out in six time waves (1981–1984,
1990–1993, 1995–1997, 1999–2004, 2005–2009 and
2010–2014). In our study, we make use of data from
the first five waves. Our measure of social capital is
based on the following specific question: ‘Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing
with people’?, where respondents (a minimum of
thousand per time wave per country) can choose
among the options ‘Most people can be trusted’,
‘You cannot be too careful’, or ‘Don’t know’. This
approach has been used in several other studies as a
measure of social capital (Knack and Keefer 1997;
Ahlerup et al. 2008; Beugelsdijk and Maseland
2011).2 In order to be able to include the trust data
in our analysis, we follow a common procedure in
2For those countries that are not included in any of the WVS waves, we use data from the Institute of Social Studies and the Economic and Social Data
Service (ESDS)/Eurobarometer, which are organizations that include the same question in their surveys. ESDS allows respondents to rate their answer on a
scale from 1 to 9. We rescaled the answers from this source by taking the proportion of respondents that answered the question with a 1, 2, 3 or 4 and
label them as answering the trust question with ‘most people can be trusted’.
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existing literature by excluding the non-respondents
and subsequently calculating the proportion of peo-
ple who answered the question with ‘Most people
can be trusted’ (Knack and Keefer 1997; Calderón,
Chong, and Galindo 2002; Kouvavas and ten Kate
2013).3 In cases where the same country was
included in multiple waves, we calculate the average
level of trust over time and assume that this average
describes a country’s level of trust in the period
1973–2008. This assumption is based on the claim
made elsewhere in the literature that social capital is
changing only very slowly over time (Algan and
Cahuc 2010). It is also corroborated by the data we
use: the average correlation between different WVS
waves of answers to the trust question is higher
than 0.8.
As is clear from the specification of the econo-
metric model in Equation (1), formal institutions
are not directly entering the analysis. Instead, the
role of institutions is analyzed indirectly by creat-
ing sub-samples of countries based on the overall
quality of the formal institutional setting. Formal
institutions are measured using data from the
World Governance Indicators (WGI). This is a
widely used database covering different dimen-
sions of institutions including the rule of law,
voice and accountability, government effectiveness,
control over corruption and regulatory quality. We
add the quality of banking regulation and super-
vision (data from Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel
2010) as a sixth dimension, because this formal
institutional dimension is of particular interest in
the context of our study. As is shown in Appendix
Table A.2, the institutional variables are highly
correlated. This is why we use principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA) to effectively capture the var-
iation in these variables into one specific
component.4 The results of the PCA are presented
in Appendix Table A.3 and Figure A.1. Table A.3
shows that the first principal component explains
over 80 per cent of the variation of the six under-
lying institutional variables. Moreover, as is shown
in Figure A.1, it is the only (principal) component
with an eigenvalue greater than 1. We take this
component as our variable measuring the quality
of the formal institutional environment (measured
by the six different dimensions) in a country and
use this in the empirical analysis. We name this
variable INSTITUTIONS. A higher value of this
variable represents a higher value of the quality
of the formal institutional environment in a
country.
We include several control variables in vector
X. These variables have been suggested by the
financial development literature (Huang 2011).
In particular, we include the initial levels of
GDP (GDP), the trade to GDP ratio (TRADE),
the inflation rate (INFLATION), population size
(POPULATION), an index variable measuring the
extent to which the country functions as a
democracy (DEMOC) and an index variable mea-
suring the existence of political constraints that
prevent policy changes from being implemented
(POLCON). Data for GDP, TRADE, INFLATION
and POPULATION come from the GFDD.5 These
variables are expected to be positively associated
with our measures of financial development. Data
for DEMOC are retrieved from the Polity IV
database; data for POLCON are taken from a
database compiled by Henisz (2002). For both
variables, a higher score on the index (i.e. becom-
ing more a democracy or facing less political
constraints) is expected to be positively related
to financial development.6
The social capital variable is time-invariant.
Ideally, therefore, we would like to use a specifica-
tion that allows time-invariant variables to be
included, e.g. a pooled or random effects specifica-
tion. However, a Hausman test shows that using a
pooled OLS or random effects model leads to biased
3We do acknowledge that using survey data to measure social capital may be criticized. In particular, this approach may lead to different interpretations of
what respondents see as social capital. For example, they may think of different people when they are asked whether ‘most people’ can be trusted. What is
more, this difference may be determined by culture (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011). One suggestion for future research would thus be to include more
than one proxy for social capital, for example measures of social capital not relying on survey data.
4We take the weighted average for the period 1996 (the first year for which we have data on formal institutions from the WGI database) to 2010 (the last
year from which we use the WGI database) for each variable per country before performing the principal component analysis. This means we assume that
the quality of formal institutions is constant over time and can be extrapolated backwards in time. Although this may appear restrictive, the average
correlation between 1996 and 2010 is higher than 0.9. We use this approach because this allows us to create data on the formal institutional environment
for the years before 1996.
5In the regression analysis, the data for GDP, INFLATION and POPULATION are expressed in logs.
6An overview of all variables used in the analysis and their respective sources can be found in Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5.
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and inconsistent estimates. Hence, Equation (1) is
specified as a fixed-effects model, which means that
ρ3 is omitted, that is, SC
i does not enter the equa-
tion. We are thus primarily interested in the coeffi-
cient ρ4. Technically, the marginal effect of financial
liberalization on financial development growth can
be written as dFDgrowthdFINLIB ¼ ρ2 þ ρ4  SC. Since SC is
always positive, a positive coefficient ρ4 indicates
that the effect of financial liberalization on financial
development growth is stronger for higher levels of
social capital is, which supports our hypothesis.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the vari-




The results of estimating the model expressed in
Equation (1) are presented in Tables 3–5. Table 3
shows that, if we take into account all countries and
years, our financial liberalization measure, as well as
its interaction with social capital, are never signifi-
cant. Of the control variables, the coefficients of the
initial values of financial deepening are always nega-
tive and highly significant. This suggests that con-
vergence of the growth rate of financial development
across countries is indeed taking place. This result is
consistently found in all the regressions we perform.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean SD Median Min Max
Dependent variables
LLY 2470 0.50 0.36 0.42 0.04 2.94
DEPGDP 2446 0.42 0.34 0.33 0.00 2.85
PRCGDP 2468 0.47 0.41 0.30 0.00 2.28
Independent variables
SC 2819 0.26 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.75
FINLIB 2557 8,18 4,17 8,75 0.00 15.0
Credit controls 2557 1.62 1.11 1.50 0.00 3.00
Interest rate controls 2557 1.79 1.33 3.00 0.00 3.00
Entry barriers 2557 1.80 1.19 2.00 0.00 3.00
Privatization 2557 1.28 1.19 1.00 0.00 3.00
International capital flows 2557 1.69 1.13 2.00 0.00 3.00
Control variables
GDP 2777 2.88e+11 9.84e+11 4.10e+10 6.80e+08 1.40e+13
INFLATION 2560 0.12 0.15 0.08 −0.11 1.00
TRADE 2678 0.66 0.50 0.55 0.06 4.40
POPULATION 2818 5.58e+07 1.57e+08 1.50e+07 1.30e+06 1.30e+09
DEMOC 2818 13.59 6.85 17.00 0.00 20.00
POLCON 2772 0.30 0.21 0.36 0.00 0.72
Additional variables (used in the principal component analysis)
Rule of law 2818 0.20 1.03 −0.01 −1.43 1.94
Voice and accountability 2818 0.22 0.91 0.01 −1.85 1.62
Government effectiveness 2818 0.35 1.00 −0.02 −1.05 2.14
Control of corruption 2818 0.28 1.11 −0.13 −1.16 2.44
Regulatory quality 2818 0.35 0.92 0.22 −1.74 1.97
Banking Supervision 2818 0.90 1.01 1.00 0.00 3.00
Table 2. Pair-wise correlation matrix.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Dependent variables
[1] LLY 1.00
[2] DEPGDP 0.94 1.00
[3] PRCGDP 0.85 0.87 1.00
Independent variables
[4] SC 0.38 0.34 0.50 1.00
[5] SC*FINLIB 0.34 0.37 0.52 0.94 1.00
[6] FINLIB 0.11 0.24 0.28 0.19 0.47 1.00
Controls
[7] GDP 0.52 0.51 0.60 0.41 0.40 0.14 1.00
[8] INFLATION −0.53 −0.50 −0.51 −0.34 −0.35 −0.23 −0.33 1.00
[9] TRADE 0.41 0.44 0.34 0.02 0.08 0.21 0.01 −0.24 1.00
[10] POPULATION 0.06 −0.03 −0.03 −0.14 −0.31 −0.45 0.44 0.09 −0.32 1.00
[11] DEMOC −0.02 0.11 0.20 0.27 0.39 0.36 0.31 0.09 −0.08 −0.26 1.00
[12] POLCON 0.15 0.22 0.25 0.14 0.24 0.30 0.20 −0.03 −0.04 −0.19 0.52 1.00
The variables GDP, INFLATION and POPULATION are expressed in logs.
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Moreover, the coefficients of the variables TRADE
and GDP are significant and have the expected sign.
Next, we focus on sub-samples of countries with
high and low quality of formal institutions.
Countries with high (low) quality of formal institu-
tions have above (below) median values of the vari-
able INSTITUTIONS. If we estimate Equation (1)
using data of countries with high quality of formal
institutions, we find no significant results for the
coefficient of financial liberalization (results dis-
played in Table 4). We also find no effect for the
interaction term between financial liberalization and
social capital. So, in countries with high levels of
formal institutions, financial liberalization does not
have an impact on financial deepening. This also
holds for countries with high levels of social capital.
Redoing the analysis using data of countries with
low quality of formal institutions shows that we find
weak evidence that financial liberalization positively
affects financial development and that this relation-
ship is stronger in countries with high levels of social
capital (results shown in Table 5). This conclusion is
based on the fact that we find significant results for
Table 3. Financial liberalization, financial development and the
role of social capital: results for all years and all countries.







FINLIB(−1) 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.12) (0.11) (0.38)
SC*FINLIB(−1) 0.005 −0.002 0.010
(0.82) (0.16) (1.10)
TRADE(−1) 0.034 0.043 0.045
(2.28)** (2.20)** (1.80)*
DEMOC(−1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.02) (0.10) (0.03)
INFLATION(−1) −0.004 0.002 0.000
(1.37) (0.43) (0.00)
GDP(−1) 0.018 0.028 0.049
(2.42)** (2.85)*** (4.50)***
POPULATION(−1) −0.025 −0.012 −0.092
(1.03) (0.37) (2.21)**
POLCON(−1) −0.000 0.000 −0.034
(0.26) (0.00) (0.99)
CONSTANT 0.090 −0.388 0.422
(0.24) (0.77) (0.59)
R2 0.16 0.13 0.15
N 512 509 512
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.1;** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the
average growth rate from t − 4 to t. All independent variables with (−1) are
measured as level values at t − 5. All models are estimated using fixed effects
and standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Table 4. Financial liberalization, financial development and the
role of social capital: results for all years and for countries with
high quality of formal institutions.







FINLIB(−1) 0.004 0.001 0.006
(1.31) (0.30) (1.17)
SC*FINLIB(−1) −0.004 −0.008 −0.001
(0.71) (0.50) (0.07)
TRADE(−1) 0.013 0.034 0.051
(0.85) (1.43) (1.63)
DEMOC(−1) −0.003 −0.003 −0.001
(2.12)** (1.54) (0.69)
INFLATION(−1) −0.005 0.007 −0.005
(1.16) (0.75) (0.71)
GDP(−1) 0.017 0.040 0.026
(1.82)* (2.09)** (1.96)*
POPULATION(−1) −0.167 −0.066 −0.033
(1.54) (0.98) (0.48)
POLCON(−1) 0.008 0.010 −0.124
(0.29) (0.19) (2.54)**
CONSTANT 0.802 0.208 −0.012
(1.32) (0.22) (0.01)
R2 0.19 0.11 0.23
N 225 224 228
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.1;** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates,
hence the average growth rate from t − 4 to t. All independent variables
with (−1) are measured as level values at t − 5. All models are estimated
using fixed effects and standard errors that are robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation.
Table 5. Financial liberalization, financial development and the
role of social capital: results for all years and for countries with
low quality of formal institutions.







FINLIB(−1) −0.003 −0.002 0.001
(0.77) (0.57) (0.17)
SC*FINLIB(−1) 0.019 0.017 0.020
(1.74)* (1.48) (1.16)
TRADE(−1) 0.085 0.088 0.079
(2.73)*** (2.40)** (1.68)*
DEMOC(−1) 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.14) (0.28) (0.16)
INFLATION(−1) −0.005 −0.001 0.005
(1.35) (0.31) (0.75)
GDP(−1) 0.025 0.029 0.066
(1.82)* (1.87)* (3.28)***
POPULATION(−1) −0.028 −0.011 −0.156
(0.80) (0.23) (2.46)**
POLCON(−1) 0.017 0.023 0.004
(0.66) (0.72) (0.08)
CONSTANT −0.005 −0.398 1.161
(0.01) (0.59) (1.06)
R2 0.22 0.23 0.24
N 287 285 284
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.1;** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates,
hence the average growth rate from t − 4 to t. All independent variables
with (−1) are measured as level values at t − 5. All models are estimated
using fixed effects and standard errors that are robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation.
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our measure of financial liberalization and its inter-
action with our measure of social capital for one of
three measures of financial development (LLY). The
signs of the coefficients for these two variables are as
expected but not significant for the other two mea-
sures of financial development (DEPGDP and
PRCGDP). Thus, we find weak evidence that for
countries with low quality of formal institutions
social capital may act as a substitute in moderating
the positive impact of financial liberalization on
financial development.
Thus far, the empirical analysis does not
strongly support our hypothesis. One reason we
find only weak support may be due to the fact that
financial liberalization policies only really took off
from the late 1980s, i.e. when the Washington
consensus became the dominant macroeconomic
policy framework in many (especially developing)
economies. As is shown in Figure 1, from 1989
there is a significant jump in the values of our
financial liberalization variable, in particular for
developing economies. Before 1989, FINLIB
remains relatively stable for developed as well as
developing economies. At the same time, Figure 2
shows that our measures of financial development
fluctuate over time, especially for the sample of
developing countries. Yet, the overall trend in
these variables for all countries (developing as
well as developed) is that they are moving upward.
Based on these findings, we argue that a positive
relationship between financial liberalization and
financial development, and the impact of social
capital on this relationship, may only occur after
1989. The trends of the variables shown in Figures
1 and 2 suggest that social capital may act as a
substitute for weak formal institutions, especially
when the implementation of financial liberaliza-













Figure 1. Financial liberalization over time for the whole sam-
ple, developing countries and developed countries, 1973–2005.
The sum of financial liberalization is measured by adding up the value
of the financial liberalization index (which can take values between 0
and 15) for the whole sample of countries, all developing and all
developed countries for the period 1973–2005. Data for the financial
liberalization index are taken from Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel
(2010). The list of developing and developed countries included in
































































































































































Figure 2. Financial development over time for the whole sam-
ple (a), developing countries (b) and developed countries (c),
1973–2011.
The three figures show data for the three financial development
measures used in the analyses for the whole sample, all developing
countries and all developed countries. The data presented are standard
indicators of financial sector development (in percentages of total GDP
of a country). The data are taken from the Global Financial
Development Database (GFDD). The list of developing and developed
countries included in our analysis is presented in Appendix Table A.1.
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Tables 6–8 show the results of estimating Equation
(1) using data for all countries in our sample for the
post-Washington consensus period (i.e. from 1989 to
2008) only. Table 6 shows that the coefficient for
FINLIB is always negative, but only when we use
LLY it is statistically significant. This suggests that
financial liberalization does not have an impact (or
may even have a negative impact) on financial devel-
opment in the post-Washington consensus period.
This outcome corroborates at least part of the existing
literature, which argues that financial liberalization as
such may reduce effective financial intermediation
(Stiglitz 2000; Boot 2000) and that financial liberal-
ization only has a positive impact on financial devel-
opment in the presence of well-developed formal
institutions.
At the same time, the coefficient for the interac-
tion between financial liberalization and social capi-
tal is always positive and significant. Figures 3–5,
which present the joint effect of financial liberaliza-
tion and the interaction of this variable with the
social capital variable, show that the overall effect
of both variables on financial development is posi-
tive for reasonable levels of financial liberalization.
Table 6. Financial liberalization, financial development and the
role of social capital: results for all countries, 1989–2008.







FINLIB(−1) −0.019 −0.015 −0.015
(2.14)** (1.61) (1.37)
SC*FINLIB(−1) 0.081 0.063 0.088
(2.82)*** (1.94)* (2.00)**
TRADE(−1) 0.024 0.016 −0.020
(0.90) (0.50) (0.38)
DEMOC(−1) −0.000 −0.000 0.006
(0.14) (0.03) (1.79)*
INFLATION(−1) −0.003 0.002 0.009
(0.63) (0.46) (1.15)
GDP(−1) 0.041 0.041 0.086
(2.69)** (2.47)** (3.08)***
POPULATION(−1) 0.020 0.015 −0.093
(0.35) (0.22) (0.84)
POLCON(−1) −0.006 −0.001 −0.043
(0.20) (0.05) (0.70)
CONSTANT −1.186 −1.144 −0.540
(1.28) (1.04) (0.30)
R2 0.23 0.17 0.23
N 303 302 305
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.1;** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates,
hence the average growth rate from t − 4 to t. All independent variables
with (−1) are measured as level values at t − 5. All models are estimated
using fixed effects and standard errors that are robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation.
Table 7. Financial liberalization, financial development and the
role of social capital: results for countries with high quality of
formal institutions, 1989–2008.







FINLIB(−1) 0.004 0.006 0.001
(0.72) (0.76) (0.04)
SC*FINLIB(−1) 0.007 0.000 0.058
(0.36) (0.01) (0.65)
TRADE(−1) −0.019 −0.009 0.015
(0.98) (0.28) (0.38)
DEMOC(−1) −0.016 −0.012 −0.006
(1.70)* (1.79)* (0.41)
INFLATION(−1) −0.006 0.006 0.006
(1.31) (0.56) (0.72)
GDP(−1) 0.057 0.072 0.121
(3.16)*** (3.68)*** (5.09)***
POPULATION(−1) 0.040 0.084 −0.205
(0.52) (1.10) (1.94)*
POLCON(−1) −0.028 0.045 0.009
(0.44) (0.44) (0.10)
CONSTANT −1.722 −2.966 0.243
(1.56) (2.68)** (0.13)
R2 0.36 0.17 0.42
N 127 126 130
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.1;** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the
average growth rate from t − 4 to t. All independent variables with (−1) are
measured as level values at t − 5. All models are estimated using fixed effects
and standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Table 8. Financial liberalization, financial development and the
role of social capital: results for countries with low quality of
formal institutions, 1989–2008.







FINLIB(−1) −0.025 −0.017 −0.019
(2.40)*** (1.68)* (1.83)*
SC*FINLIB(−1) 0.114 0.073 0.102
(3.27)*** (2.20)** (2.65)**
TRADE(−1) 0.092 0.057 −0.076
(1.74)* (0.98) (0.90)
DEMOC(−1) −0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.10) (0.08) (0.46)
INFLATION(−1) −0.002 0.000 0.012
(0.41) (0.05) (1.31)
GDP(−1) 0.030 0.023 0.095
(1.31) (0.89) (2.22)**
POPULATION(−1) 0.043 0.067 −0.022
(0.54) (0.76) (0.17)
POLCON(−1) 0.005 0.001 0.017
(0.15) (0.03) (0.25)
CONSTANT −1.255 −1.494 −1.635
(0.92) (0.95) (0.75)
R2 0.37 0.33 0.40
N 176 176 175
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.1;** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the
average growth rate from t − 4 to t. All independent variables with (−1) are
measured as level values at t − 5. All models are estimated using fixed effects
and standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
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In particular, these figures show that the marginal
effect of financial liberalization on financial develop-
ment turns from being negative and significant to
positive and significant as the level of social capital
increases. As argued above, this may be because
social capital and formal institutions are substitutes.
These results suggest that, at least for the period
1989–2008, financial liberalization has a positive
impact on financial development in countries with
higher levels of social capital.
Redoing the analysis for countries with high qual-
ity of formal institutions yields no significant results
(results displayed in Table 7). This suggests that for
countries with high quality of formal institutions,
social capital is not a substitute, not even during a
period in which financial liberalization policies are
relatively strong. When we redo the analysis with
data from countries with low quality of formal insti-
tutions, we find strong support for our hypothesis
(Table 8). First of all, for all three variables of finan-
cial development, the coefficient for the financial
liberalization variable is negative and significant.
Thus, in these countries financial liberalization dur-
ing the post-Washington consensus period actually
negatively contributes to financial development.
Second, the coefficient for the interaction term
between financial liberalization and social capital is
always positive and significant. This outcome sug-
gests that in countries with low quality of formal
institutions and high levels of social capital, financial
liberalization has a positive impact on financial
development, since social capital may substitute for
low quality of formal institutions. Figures 6–8, in
which we present the joint effect of financial liberal-
ization and the interaction of this variable with the
social capital variable, shows that the overall effect of
both variables on financial development is positive
for reasonable levels of financial liberalization. More
specifically, these figures show for the post-





0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Figure 5. Marginal effects of financial liberalization on private
credit to GDP.
This graph displays the marginal effect of financial liberalization (solid
line) on financial development for different values of social capital








0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Figure 3. Marginal effects of financial liberalization on liquid
liabilities to GDP.
This graph displays the marginal effect of financial liberalization (solid
line) on financial development for different values of social capital





0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Figure 4. Marginal effects of financial liberalization on deposits
to GDP.
This graph displays the marginal effect of financial liberalization (solid
line) on financial development for different values of social capital
(horizontal axis). The dotted lines represent the 95 per cent confidence
interval.
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effect changes when we move from a sample con-
sisting of countries with very poor institutional qual-
ity to countries with very high institutional quality.
These figures clearly show that the interaction effect
becomes weaker when the quality of formal institu-
tions increases, and that the interaction term is sig-
nificant and positive for samples with low
institutional quality. This can be considered as evi-
dence that social capital can take over the role of
formal institutions when the latter are of poor
quality.
Overall, the results from our empirical analysis
seem to support our hypothesis. We find that the
association between financial liberalization and
financial development is indeed conditional on the
prevailing level of social capital. Yet, this only holds
for countries with weak formal institutions and dur-
ing a period in which financial liberalization efforts
are strong (i.e. during the post-Washington consen-
sus period of 1989–2008).
Table 9 provides the list of countries that have
relatively high (i.e. above the sample median) values
of social capital, while at the same time having for-
mal institutions of poor quality (i.e. below the sam-
ple median value). The list contains countries from
various regions and continents. However, most
countries are from Asia (6 of 17), Africa (5) and
Eastern Europe (4); no countries from South
America are included. Moreover, it includes only
emerging economies, suggesting that our results
hold most strongly for this group of countries.







Figure 6. Magnitude and significance of interaction term across
different samples.
This graph displays the coefficient of interaction term (model 1) and
the 95 per cent confidence interval (dotted lines) when I move from a
sample including only countries with very poor institutional quality (1),
to a sample of countries with very high institutional quality (4). These
samples are formed by taking quartiles (first, second, third and fourth)










1 2 3 4
Figure 7. Magnitude and significance of interaction term across
different samples.
This graph displays the coefficient of interaction term (model 1) and
the 95 per cent confidence interval (dotted lines) when I move from a
sample including only countries with very poor institutional quality (1),
to a sample of countries with very high institutional quality (4). These
samples are formed by taking quartiles (first, second, third and fourth)
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Figure 8. Magnitude and significance of interaction term across
different samples.
This graph displays the coefficient of interaction term (model 1) and
the 95 per cent confidence interval (dotted lines) when I move from a
sample including only countries with very poor institutional quality (1),
to a sample of countries with very high institutional quality (4). These
samples are formed by taking quartiles (first, second, third and fourth)
of the principal component that defines institutional quality. PRCGDP is
the dependent variable.
Table 9. Countries with high social capital (above the median)









We carry out a number of robustness checks to
verify the robustness of the results we have discussed
so far. First, the empirical model expressed in
Equation (1) has a number of drawbacks.
Since it is a fixed-effects model, time-invariant vari-
ables cannot be included. As explained, this also means
that our social capital variable does not directly enter
the empirical analysis. One way to get around this
problem is to include group means of the time-variant
independent variables and subtract the group means
from these time-variant variables, a procedure known
in the literature as cluster-mean centring (Antonakis
et al. 2010; Dieleman and Templin 2014). By doing so,
the model becomes a within-between estimation,
which is a slight adjustment of the Mundlak (1978)
specification.7 The model now reads as:
Growth of FDit;t4 ¼ β1 þ ρ1 Xit5  Xi
 
þ ρ2Xi þ ρ3SCi þ μi
þ εit; (2)
where X contains all time-variant variables (i.e. FD,
SC  FINLIB, FINLIB, and the vector of control vari-
ables) and X contains the group level means (mea-
sured from t  5 onwards) of the time-variant
variables.8 Again, we use the 4-year period growth
rate of financial development as the dependent vari-
able, with the level values just prior to the 4-year
period (i.e. at t  5) as the independent variables.
Mundlak (1978) shows that in such a specification,
ρ1 captures the within-group variation over time and
that this coefficient is exactly equal to the coefficient of
a fixed-effects estimation, even when the unobserved
effects are assumed to be random.9 The between
effects of the time-variant averages are captured by
coefficient ρ2. As this model is measured assuming
random effects, social capital is not omitted and hence
ρ3 can be used to measure the (between) effect of the
prevailing level of social capital on financial develop-
ment. As both terms of the interaction term are now
included separately, the interaction term can be prop-
erly interpreted (Bell and Jones 2015).10 Table 10 pre-
sents the results of the estimations of Equation (2). We
show the results for the sub-sample of countries with
weak quality of formal institutions and use data for the
post-Washington consensus period only.11 As is clear
from this table, the results are similar to those pre-
sented in Table 8. The coefficients for the interaction
term and the financial liberalization term are always
Table 10. Financial liberalization, financial development and
the role of social capital: results for countries with low quality
of formal institutions, 1989–2008 (Mundlak model estimations).







SC 1.352 0.044 0.487
(2.63)*** (0.24) (1.34)
FINLIB(−1) −0.063 −0.015 −0.020
(3.49)*** (2.61)*** (2.21)**
SC*FINLIB(−1) 0.289 0.069 0.103
(3.83)*** (2.86)*** (2.79)***
TRADE(−1) 0.325 0.063 −0.080
(2.10)** (1.21) (1.13)
DEMOC(−1) 0.005 0.001 0.002
(0.71) (0.33) (0.48)
INFLATION(−1) −0.016 0.001 0.012
(0.90) (0.13) (1.28)
GDP(−1) 0.149 0.027 0.093
(2.06)** (1.13) (2.50)**
POPULATION(−1) 0.033 0.012 −0.003
(1.20) (1.19) (0.15)
POLCON(−1) 0.021 −0.003 0.018
(0.18) (0.07) (0.32)
CONSTANT −0.263 −0.040 −0.197
(0.68) (0.29) (0.71)
R2 (within) 0.32 0.33 0.39
N 176 176 175
t-Statistics in parentheses: ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
All dependent variables with are measured as 4-year average growth rates,
hence the average growth rate from t − 4 to t. All independent variables
with (−1) are measured as level values at t − 5. The added means of the
time variant variables are estimated, but not displayed in this table for
matters of convenience.
7The exact Mundlak specification would read as: Growth of FDit;t4 ¼ β1 þ ρ1 Xit5
 þ ρ2Xi þ ρ3SCi þ μit þ εit in this case, coefficient ρ2 would reflect the
difference between the between and the within effect, which is less easily interpretable as ρ2 in the model above, which only measures the between
effect. The coefficient ρ1 is equal in Mundlak’s model and this model, but the constants differ. Another advantage of this model over a standard Mundlak
equation is that there is no correlation between Xit5 and Xi in the model (as opposed to the Mundlak model). This leads to more precise estimates.
Although the model thus is slightly different, for matters of convenience we refer to this model as ‘the Mundlak model’.
8Xi is thus the average of the level of X in country i, where X is measured at t − 5, t − 9, t − 14, etc.
9Naturally, this only is the case as long as the fixed-effects regression contains the same variables as the Mundlak regression.
10Despite the attractive features of the within-between estimation, there is some debate on the interpretability of time-invariant variables in these
specifications (social capital in our case). More specifically, while the estimated coefficients of time-invariant variables may be consistent, the standard
errors can become too small (especially when the time invariant effect is correlated with the individual effect), leading to potential incorrect conclusions
concerning the statistical significance of these variables (Krishnakumar 2006; Chatelain and Ralf 2010). Coefficient ρ3 (i.e. the coefficient for social capital)
should thus be interpreted with caution.
11The results for the other samples are not reported, but are very similar to the results presented in Tables 3–7. The results of these other samples are
available on request from the authors.
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significant and do not switch sign. Moreover, the
coefficient of the social capital variable is only signifi-
cant (and positive) for one of three specifications (i.e.
when we use LLY as our measure of financial devel-
opment), suggesting that the direct relationship
between the level of social capital and financial devel-
opment is weak.12
As a second robustness check, we use five- instead
of four-year average growth rates of the levels of
financial development. All independent variables are
again measured as the level of these variables at the
end of the previous period. Thus, the growth of finan-
cial development for the period 1974–1978 is
explained by the levels of the independent variables
in 1973, etc. The results of the analysis, using data for
the post-Washington consensus period and for coun-
tries with weak formal institutions only, are reported
in Table 11. These results are very similar to those
reported earlier in Table 8. The results for other per-
iods and countries (not shown) are also similar to
those reported earlier in Tables 3–5 and 6–8.13 The
results from this robustness check confirm that the
association between financial liberalization and finan-
cial development is conditional on the prevailing level
of social capital; yet, this only holds for countries with
weak formal institutions and during a period in which
financial liberalization efforts are strong.
Third, we carry out the same analysis, but instead
of using our composite measure of financial liberal-
ization policies, we replace the composite measure
and use the individual policy measures in the regres-
sion model. Thus, we run regressions using policy
variables for credit controls and excessively high
reserve requirements, bank entry barriers, state own-
ership in the banking sector, interest rate controls,
and restrictions on international capital flows. The
results are shown in Tables 12–16 and are generally
Table 11. Financial liberalization, financial development and
the role of social capital: results for countries with low quality
of formal institutions, 1989–2008 (estimations with 5-year
averages).







FINLIB(−1) −0.021 −0.014 −0.009
(2.93)*** (2.00)* (0.89)
SC*FINLIB(−1) 0.107 0.074 0.064
(4.07)*** (3.30)*** (1.76)*
TRADE(−1) 0.132 0.126 −0.147
(2.10)** (1.94)* (1.58)
DEMOC(−1) −0.000 −0.000 0.001
(0.13) (0.14) (0.36)
INFLATION(−1) −0.000 0.002 0.014
(0.03) (0.24) (1.37)
GDP(−1) 0.012 0.005 0.035
(0.39) (0.15) (0.72)
POPULATION(−1) 0.015 0.029 −0.026
(0.19) (0.32) (0.18)
POLCON(−1) 0.018 0.013 0.050
(0.45) (0.33) (0.78)
CONSTANT −0.390 −0.444 −0.137
(0.29) (0.29) (0.06)
R2 0.51 0.50 0.47
N 129 129 129
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
All dependent variables are measured as 5-year average growth rates,
hence the average growth rate from t − 5 to t. All independent variables
with (−1) are measured as level values at t − 6. All models are estimated
using fixed effects and standard errors that are robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation.
Table 12. Interest rate controls, financial development and the
role of social capital: results for countries with low quality of
formal institutions, 1989–2008.







INT(−1) −0.160 −0.046 −0.055
(1.71)* (1.08) (1.15)
SC*INT(−1) 0.811 0.156 0.316
(2.38)** (1.08) (1.83)*
TRADE(−1) 0.235 0.050 −0.094
(1.16) (0.89) (1.04)
DEMOC(−1) 0.003 0.000 0.002
(0.37) (0.22) (0.53)
INFLATION(−1) −0.017 −0.000 0.011
(0.96) (0.00) (1.08)
GDP(−1) 0.099 0.028 0.092
(1.39) (1.18) (2.54)**
POPULATION(−1) 0.146 0.031 −0.044
(0.61) (0.38) (0.35)
POLCON(−1) −0.009 −0.011 0.009
(0.10) (0.31) (0.14)
CONSTANT −4.389 −0.986 −1.140
(1.01) (0.75) (0.63)
R2 0.30 0.31 0.40
N 176 176 175
t-Statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1; *** p < 0.01.
This table displays the regressions results for Equation (1), where the
financial liberalization composite measure (FINLIB) has been replaced by
a measure of the extent of interest rate controls (INT; data from Abiad,
Detragiache, and Tressel 2010). All dependent variables are measured as
4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t − 4 to
t. All independent variables with (−1) are measured as level values at
t − 5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors
that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
12As a further robustness check, we re-estimate the model presented in Table 10, using the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator, instead of the adjusted
Mundlak specification. The results are qualitatively very similar to those of the adjusted Mundlak specification. The results of the Hausman-Taylor estimator
are not presented in the article to save space, but are available on request from the authors.
13The results for the other periods and countries are available on request from the authors.
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similar to the results discussed earlier. Thus, again it
is confirmed that the association between financial
liberalization and financial development is condi-
tional on the prevailing level of social capital, but
this is only true for countries with weak formal
institutions and during a period in which financial
liberalization efforts are strong. Yet, the results in
Tables 12–16 also make clear that this result depends
at least to some extent on the type of financial
liberalization measures taken. In particular, the sup-
port for our hypothesis is most strongly confirmed
when governments reduce or remove entry barriers
for new banks. In all three regressions, the coeffi-
cient for the variable measuring the extent to which
entry barriers are removed is negative and signifi-
cant, while at the same time the coefficient of the
interaction term between entry barriers variable and
the social capital variable is positive and significant.
The results are also supporting our hypothesis when
the focus is on removing or reducing interest rate
and credit controls, and/or controls on international
capital flows, in particular when we use LLY and
PRCGDP as our measures of financial development.
We find no results, however, when governments
reduce their direct involvement in the financial sec-
tor as owners of banks (Table 15). Apparently, this
type of policies does not contribute to financial
development. This is true in general, as well as for
countries with high levels of social capital during
and weak formal institutions.
Finally, we redo the regressions and experiment
with the set of countries we include in the analysis to
verify whether the results may be specific for specific
regions of countries. In particular, we run regressions
in which we leave out all Asian countries that were hit
by the Asian crisis (i.e. China, Thailand, Vietnam,
Indonesia the Philippines). Again, the results (not
shown) from this robustness check confirm our earlier
findings, i.e. the association between financial liberal-
ization and financial development is conditional on
the prevailing level of social capital, but this is only
true for countries with weak formal institutions and
Table 13. Credit controls, financial development and the role
of social capital: results for countries with low quality of formal
institutions, 1989–2008.







CREDIT(−1) −0.167 −0.044 −0.046
(1.92)* (1.10) (1.72)*
SC*CREDIT(−1) 0.941 0.223 0.205
(3.01)*** (1.70)* (1.96)*
TRADE(−1) 0.272 0.054 −0.077
(1.44) (0.99) (0.83)
DEMOC(−1) 0.003 0.000 0.002
(0.41) (0.16) (0.56)
INFLATION(−1) −0.001 0.004 0.015
(0.04) (0.79) (1.67)
GDP(−1) 0.135 0.026 0.112
(1.94)* (1.16) (2.91)***
POPULATION(−1) 0.079 0.029 −0.057
(0.36) (0.36) (0.46)
POLCON(−1) 0.012 −0.006 0.006
(0.13) (0.17) (0.10)
CONSTANT −4.095 −0.924 −1.399
(1.01) (0.66) (0.77)
R2 0.33 0.33 0.38
N 176 176 175
t-Statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1; *** p < 0.01.
This table displays the regressions results for Equation (1), where the
financial liberalization composite measure (FINLIB) has been replaced by
a measure of the extent of interest rate controls (CREDIT; data from
Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel 2010). All dependent variables are mea-
sured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate
from t − 4 to t. All independent variables with (−1) are measured as level
values at t − 5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard
errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Table 14. Entry barriers, financial development and the role of
social capital: results for countries with low quality of formal
institutions, 1989–2008.







ENTRY(−1) −0.130 −0.030 −0.065
(2.50)** (2.18)** (2.86)***
SC*ENTRY(−1) 0.550 0.103 0.242
(2.20)** (1.76)* (2.05)**
TRADE(−1) 0.343 0.084 −0.034
(1.73)* (1.41) (0.41)
DEMOC(−1) 0.001 −0.000 0.002
(0.13) (0.01) (0.49)
INFLATION(−1) −0.009 0.002 0.013
(0.56) (0.49) (1.35)
GDP(−1) 0.140 0.033 0.115
(2.10)** (1.44) (3.21)***
POPULATION(−1) 0.093 0.017 −0.051
(0.35) (0.19) (0.42)
POLCON(−1) −0.000 −0.005 0.016
(0.00) (0.13) (0.26)
CONSTANT −4.508 −0.881 −1.575
(0.90) (0.56) (0.91)
R2 0.27 0.30 0.39
N 176 176 175
t-statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1;** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
This table displays the regressions results for Equation (1), where the
financial liberalization composite measure (FINLIB) has been replaced by
a measure of the extent of interest rate controls (ENTRY; data from Abiad,
Detragiache, and Tressel 2010). All dependent variables are measured as
4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t − 4 to
t. All independent variables with (−1) are measured as level values at
t − 5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors
that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
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during a period in which financial liberalization efforts
are strong.14 This outcome does not seem to be spe-
cific to countries from different regions.
Summary of the results
Summarizing the results from this study, the relation-
ship between financial liberalization and financial
development appears to be conditional on the pre-
vailing level social capital, which confirms our main
hypothesis. Yet, this conditionality is mostly relevant
for countries with weak formal institutions and dur-
ing the so-called post-Washington consensus period
when financial liberalization policies really took off.
In case countries have developed formal institutions
of higher quality, social capital is no longer of signifi-
cant influence in determining the success of financial
liberalization. These results suggest that social capital
may act as a substitute for weakly developed formal
institutions in determining the relationship between
financial liberalization and financial development.
We explain these results by pointing out that finan-
cial liberalization policies in emerging economies
accelerated from the late 1990s onwards. These coun-
tries acted upon the advice of the Washington con-
sensus, which stipulated that countries could benefit
from liberalizing their financial sectors (Gore 2000).
However, as these countries did not have the proper
institutional environment, for many of these countries
financial liberalization often failed to promote financial
development. This is in line with the evidence found in
several empirical studies on the impact of financial
liberalization policies on financial development and
economic growth. These studies have identified insti-
tutional quality as an important prerequisite for suc-
cessful financial liberalization policies. The results of
our study suggest that social capital can be a substitute
for formal institutional quality. Consequently,
Table 15. State ownership, financial development and the role
of social capital: results for countries with low quality of formal
institutions, 1989–2008.







STATE(−1) −0.056 −0.013 0.001
(1.00) (0.56) (0.02)
SC*STATE(−1) 0.153 0.098 0.020
(0.66) (0.91) (0.11)
TRADE(−1) 0.279 0.067 −0.048
(1.32) (1.03) (0.56)
DEMOC(−1) 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.33) (0.08) (0.57)
INFLATION(−1) −0.008 0.003 0.014
(0.54) (0.68) (1.48)
GDP(−1) 0.155 0.021 0.108
(1.84)* (0.84) (2.49)**
POPULATION(−1) 0.090 0.003 −0.095
(0.32) (0.04) (0.70)
POLCON(−1) −0.036 −0.016 −0.008
(0.35) (0.41) (0.13)
CONSTANT −4.805 −0.405 −0.673
(0.87) (0.27) (0.30)
R2 0.25 0.29 0.36
N 176 176 175
t-Statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1;** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
This table displays the regressions results for Equation (1), where the
financial liberalization composite measure (FINLIB) has been replaced by
a measure of the extent of interest rate controls (STATE; data from Abiad,
Detragiache, and Tressel 2010). All dependent variables are measured as
4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t − 4 to
t. All independent variables with (−1) are measured as level values at
t − 5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors
that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Table 16. Capital account controls, financial development and
the role of social capital: Results for countries with low quality
of formal institutions, 1989–2008.







CAP(−1) −0.129 −0.034 −0.021
(1.95)* (1.57) (1.06)
SC*CAP(−1) 0.519 0.168 0.169
(2.34)** (1.98)* (2.72)***
TRADE(−1) 0.302 0.074 −0.034
(1.46) (1.15) (0.42)
DEMOC(−1) 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.25) (0.05) (0.50)
INFLATION(−1) −0.013 0.002 0.013
(0.94) (0.36) (1.48)
GDP(−1) 0.123 0.020 0.098
(1.41) (0.78) (2.52)**
POPULATION(−1) 0.117 0.020 −0.079
(0.45) (0.23) (0.63)
POLCON(−1) −0.000 −0.009 −0.005
(0.00) (0.22) (0.07)
CONSTANT −4.527 −0.643 −0.721
(0.88) (0.42) (0.39)
R2 0.28 0.31 0.38
N 176 176 175
t-Statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1;** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
This table displays the regressions results for Equation (1), where the
financial liberalization composite measure (FINLIB) has been replaced by
a measure of the extent of interest rate controls (CAP; data from Abiad,
Detragiache, and Tressel 2010). All dependent variables are measured as
4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t − 4 to
t. All independent variables with (−1) are measured as level values at
t − 5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors
that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
14Again, these results are available on request from the authors.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 1283
countries with high levels of social capital managed to
benefit from financial liberalization in the post-
Washington consensus period, despite the low quality
of their formal institutions.
V. Conclusion
In this article, we have investigated why the effects of
financial liberalization on financial development differ
among countries.While the existing literature provides
several answers to this question, we contribute by
identifying an important prerequisite to successful
financial liberalization, i.e. social capital. By perform-
ing an empirical analysis using panel data on 82 coun-
tries in the period 1973–2008, we find evidence that the
success of financial liberalization in promoting finan-
cial development is conditional on the prevailing level
of social capital. The conditional impact of social capi-
tal on the relationship between financial liberalization
and financial development is especially strong during
the so-called post-Washington consensus period and
for countries with a weak institutional environment.
Moreover, we show that this outcome is especially
relevant for emerging economies and for different
types of financial liberalization policies, except for
policies aiming at reducing the state ownership of
banks. These results remain robust after performing a
range of different robustness analyses.
We interpret these results as follows. During the
post-Washington consensus period (i.e. from 1989
onwards), many emerging economies liberalized
their financial sectors as this was the generally
accepted view on how to carry out growth-enhan-
cing macroeconomic policies. At the same time,
several of these countries did not develop the
necessary formal institutions to make sure finan-
cial liberalization would lead to higher levels of
financial development. As a result, financial liber-
alization generally failed to promote financial
development in these countries. However, for
some of these countries, a high prevailing level of
social capital could effectively take over the role of
formal institutions, thereby ensuring that financial
liberalization did positively contribute to financial
deepening.
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Appendix
Table A.1. List of countries for which data are available in the sample.
Albania Costa Rica Hong Kong Mozambique Spain
Argentina Cote d’Ivoire Hungary Netherlands Sri Lanka
Australia Czech Rep India New Zealand Sweden
Austria Denmark Indonesia Nicaragua Switzerland
Azerbaijan Dominican Rep Israel Nigeria Tanzania
Bangladesh Ecuador Italy Norway Thailand
Belarus Egypt Japan Pakistan Tunisia
Belgium El Salvador Jordan Paraguay Turkey
Bolivia Estonia Kenya Peru Uganda
Brazil Ethiopia Korea Philippines Ukraine
Great Britain Finland Kyrgyz Rep Poland United States
Bulgaria France Latvia Portugal Uruguay
Burkina-Faso Georgia Lithuania Romania Vietnam
Cameroon Germany Madagascar Russia Zimbabwe
Canada Ghana Malaysia Senegal
China Greece Mexico Singapore
Colombia Guatemala Morocco South Africa
Countries in italic belong to the group of developed countries, all other countries are considered developing countries.
Table A.2. Correlation matrix formal institution variables and social capital.
GOV REG VOICE RULE SC BANK
GOV 1
REG 0.93 1
VOICE 0.84 0.86 1
RULE 0.96 0.91 0.87 1
SC 0.62 0.51 0.49 0.62 1
BANK 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.58 0.36 1
GOV, REG, VOICE and RULE refer to government efficiency, regulatory quality, voice and accountability and rule of law, respectively. The data for these
variables are obtained from the World Governance Indicators (WGI). SC refers to social capital using information from the World Value Surveys (WVS). BANK
is a measure of the quality of banking supervision, a variable that is retrieved from the dataset created by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010).
Table A.3. Principal component analysis for the institutional
variables.
Components Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative proportion
1 4.83 0.805 0.805
2 0.84 0.139 0.944
3 0.20 0.034 0.978
4 0.72 0.012 0.990
5 0.04 0.007 0.996
6 0.02 0.003 1.000
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Table A.4. Data description and sources.
Short definition Source
Dependent variables
LLY Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) Global Financial
Development Database
(GFDD); available for
DEPGDP Financial system deposits to GDP (%) GFDD
PRCGDP Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (%) GFDD
Independent variables
SC The average proportion of people within a country that have answered ‘most people can be
trusted’ to the following question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?
World Values Survey
FINLIB Measures the existence of credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barrier in the financial sector,
state ownership in the banking sector and restrictions on international capital flows; see below.
Abiad et al. (2010)
Credit controls and
reserve requirements
Measures whether there are ceilings on credit towards certain sectors, whether there are high reserve
requirements and whether there is directed credit towards favoured sectors or industries.
Abiad et al. (2010)
Interest rate controls Measures whether the government imposes interest rate controls, either directly or by means of
interest rate floors, ceilings or interest rate bands.
Abiad et al. (2010)
Entry barriers Measures whether there are licensing requirements for newly established domestic financial
institutions, restrictions on certain banking practices and entry barriers for foreign banks.
Abiad et al. (2010)
State ownership in the
banking sector
Measures the share of banking assets controlled by state-owned banks. Abiad et al. (2010)
Restrictions on international
capital flows
Measures whether there are capital account controls and restrictions, transaction taxes and
whether multiple exchange rates are used.
Abiad et al. (2010)
Control variables
GDP Total gross domestic product. GFDD
INFLATION Yearly inflation rates. Inflation rates above 100% and below −100% are excluded. GFDD
TRADE The ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP GFDD
POPULATION The total size of the population. GFDD
DEMOC An index, ranging from 0 to 20, that measures the extent of democracy, where 0 refers to a full
autocracy and 20 refers to a full democracy.
Polity IV Database
POLCON Index that estimates the existence of political constraints. It considers various features of the
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government and measures the overall ability of
these underlying political structures to support credible policy commitments.
Henisz (2002)
Additional variables (used in Principal component analysis)
World Governance
Indicators
These aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert
survey respondents to measure a country’s government effectiveness, voice and accountability,





Measures the independence of the banking supervisory agency, whether risk-based capital
adequacy ratios based on the Basel standard are adopted and the coverage and conduct of
supervisory oversight.
Abiad et al. (2010)
Table A.5. Data availability and type.
Data availability Data type
Dependent variables
LLY 1973–2008 Annual observations
DEPGDP 1973–2008 Annual observations




Credit controls and reserve requirements 1973–2008 Annual observations
Interest rate controls 1973–2008 Annual observations
Entry barriers 1973–2008 Annual observations
State ownership in the banking sector 1973–2008 Annual observations
Restrictions on international capital flows 1973–2008 Annual observations
Control variables
GDP 1973–2008 Annual observations
INFLATION 1973–2008 Annual observations
TRADE 1973–2008 Annual observations
POPULATION 1973–2008 Annual observations
DEMOC 1973–2008 Time-invariant
POLCON 1973–2008 Time-invariant
Additional variables (used in Principal component analysis)
World Governance Indicators 1996–2008 Bi-annual observations
for 1996–2001; annual
for 2002–2008








1 2 3 4 5 6
Eigenvalues
Figure A.1. Principal component analysis – graphical expression of eigenvalues of components.
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